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Abstract
Popular discourse about the Supreme Court often seeks to characterize
its direction in political terms. Yet the Rehnquist Court, while it has
undoubtedly turned rightward, has never turned as starkly rightward as
predicted in such accounts,1 even though Presidents Reagan and Bush
between them filled five seats on the current Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Popular discourse about the Supreme Court often seeks to characterize
its direction in political terms. Yet the Rehnquist Court, while it has
undoubtedly turned rightward, has never turned as starkly rightward as
predicted in such accounts, 1 even though Presidents Reagan and Bush
between them filled five seats on the current Court.2 To be sure, President
Clinton-with two appointments of his own in the last five years-has had
the chance to counterbalance the Reagan-Bush nominations.3 But both
before and after Clinton's appointments, it was evident that Justices who
were expected to be "conservative" sometimes voted for "liberal" or
"moderate" results.
Why might this be so? One explanation might be that court-packing is
simply harder than it looks, and a president's ability to predict the judicial
orientation of his nominees is inherently prone to error.4 President
Eisenhower is famously said to have labeled as "mistakes" his appointments

1. Compare David G. Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Court

(1992) with James F. Simon, The Center Holds (1995).
2. President Reagan nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, in addition to elevating Justice William
Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship. President Bush nominated, and the Senate confirmed,
Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas.
3. President Clinton nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
4. See, e.g., Christoper E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The
Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. Rv. 1111, 1130 (1994).
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of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.5 Likewise,
President Nixon's appointment of Justice Harry A. Blackmun hardly
produced, as expected, a conservative "Minnesota Twin" to Chief Justice
Warren Burger. And those who predicted that Justice David Souter's
appointment would be a "home run" for conservative causes later lamented
that it had been something less than a bunt.
But three other explanations seem more powerful than presidential
miscalculation alone. This essay seeks to explore those explanations. First,
the institutional structure of the Court may constrain or systematically
moderate ideological tendencies. Second, a Justice's jurisprudential
commitments may limit his or her expression of ideological
orientation. Finally, the very concept of conservative judicial ideology is
quite complex, and thus an apparently "liberal" result sometimes represents
simply the dominance of one strand of conservatism over others. These
institutional, jurisprudential, and ideological factors might help explain the
surprising moderation of Justices predicted to be conservative.

II. THE PHENOMENON OF IDEOLOGICAL SHORTFALL
Without doubt, the Rehnquist Court has taken positions consistent with
conservative politics in a variety of constitutional areas since 1980. The
Court has narrowed pregnant women's rights against state regulation of
abortion 6 and rejected the claim that consensual homosexual sex is protected
by the same conceltion of liberty that had earlier protected access to abortion
and contraception. The Court has likewise declined to extend such liberty
rights to physician-assisted suicide.8 The Court has been increasingly willing
to invalidate race-based affirmative action programs, 9 even when
implemented by the federal government. 10 In an analogous line of cases, the
Court has struck down several state attempts to create majority-minority

5. Asked whether he had made any mistakes as President, Eisenhower said: .'Yes, two,
and they are both sitting on the Supreme Court."' HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JusTIcEs AND
PRESIDENTS

266 (3d ed. 1992).

6. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
7. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
8. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (upholding state ban on
assisted suicide against a substantive due process challenge).
9. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (invalidating
under strict scrutiny a race-based preference in a municipal procurement program).
10. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (evaluating
federal affirmative action program under strict scrutiny and remanding constitutionality of the
program under appropriate standard).
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electoral districts." The Court has made it more difficult for challengers to
prove that a school district is continuing to violate the requirements of Brown
v. Board of Education.12 For the first time in sixty years, the Court has
sought to restrain federal power in relation to the power of the states by
striking down a congressional assertion of power under the Commerce

Clause.

Similarly, the Court has struck down congressional efforts to

"commandeer" state legislative or executive action. 14 Perhaps nowhere has
the Court's conservative trend been more apparent than in the area of
criminal justice.15 Hence, it is difficult to dispute that Presidents Reagan and

Bush had considerable success in moving the Court to the political right.
The Court, however, has also issued a number of decisions
disappointing conservative advocates. For instance, the Court did not, as
many had predicted, overrule Roe v. Wade.1 6 Nor did it eliminate

11. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (striking down congressional
redistricting where evidence showed that race was overriding purpose); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (striking down congressional redistricting where bizarre shape of the
prescribed districts created an inference that race motivated the action).
12. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) (holding
that district court abused discretion in ordering an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict
violation of the principles of Brown).
13. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating federal law that
prohibited gun possession near a school without any requirement that the gun had moved in
interstate commerce and without any congressional findings of fact on commerce effects).
14. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383-84 (1997) (invalidating a provision
of the Brady Bill that imposed on state law enforcement officers the obligation to perform
background checks on handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149
(1992) (invalidating take-title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 636 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding
sentence enhancements for conduct of which the defendant was acquitted); Whren v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996) (upholding pretextual traffic stops supported by a
reasonable articulable suspicion); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992)
(narrowing habeas corpus review); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (upholding
use of victim impact statements in death penalty sentencing hearings); Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 300 (1990) (holding that Miranda does not apply when one posing as a prison
inmate induces a defendant to confess); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)
(upholding the pretrial detention of defendants found likely to be dangerous); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (upholding state death penalty against equal protection
challenge based on social science research indicating racially disparate impact).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69
(1992) (reaffirming the central holding of Roe that the state may not criminalize abortion prior
to the viability of the fetus).
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Establishment Clause restrictions on school prayer. 7 The Court declined to
allow the states or Congress to criminalize flag burning. 8 And,
notwithstanding other harbingers of an antifederalist revival, the Court
forbade state voters from imposing term limits on their federal legislatorsalbeit narrowly and over a bitter dissent.19 Some recent decisions extending
the Equal Protection Clause drew a cacophony of conservative oppositionfor example, a decision barring the exclusion of women from an all-male
public academy 20 and a decision barring a state from precluding all claims of
discrimination based on homosexual orientation. 2' The Court granted free
access to state appeals courts for indigent parents attempting to retain rights
of relationship to their children, thus reviving a long-dormant strand of
fundamental rights analysis in equal protection law.22 Finally, the Rehnquist
Court has consistently interpreted the Free Speech Clause to forbid
government prescriptions of orthodoxy, protecting groups
as divergent as
2
leftist flag burners23 and white supremacist cross burners. F
Even in decisions reaching conservative results, the Court has
articulated doctrines that stop short of their apparent logical conclusion. For
example, in the affirmative action cases, the Court has stopped short of
establishing outright color blindness as a constitutional norm, intimating that
race-based affirmative action might be upheld on somewhat weaker
justifications than would be required of policies discriminating against racial
minorities. 25 In cases imposing federalism-based limits on congressional
17. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding impermissible the official
recitation of a non-denominational prayer at a middle school graduation ceremony).
18. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (involving a
congressional statute); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (involving a state statute).
19. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 782-83 (1995)
(holding that state-imposed term limits violated the Qualifications Clauses and infringed the
interests of the national citizenry).
20. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286-87 (1996) (striking down Virginia
Military Institute's exclusion of women for lack of an "exceedingly persuasive" reason).
21. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional
amendment that denied to homosexuals the opportunity to enact or enforce local and state
antidiscrimination measures).
22. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555,559 (1996).
23. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
24. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (unanimously striking
down law barring the placement of symbols likely to arouse racial anger or alarm).
25. While subjecting race-based preferences to strict scrutiny, the Court sought to
"dispel the notion that strict scrutiny [in this context] is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980)). Under such strict but not fatal scrutiny, governments might
permissibly adopt race preferences that are narrowly tailored to redress specifically identified
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power, the Court has barred congressional acts requiring states to enact or
enforce specified policies but allowed similar results to be accomplished by
imposing regulatory conditions on federal funding that states find irresistible
as a practical matter.2 And, in free speech challenges, the Court has
sometimes split the difference between the speech claim and the government.
For example, the Court has struck down a hate speech law while upholding a
hate crime penalty enhancement statute,2 7 upheld some but not all regulations
of anti-abortion protestors,2 and permitted public airport terminals to ban the

solicitation of funds but not the sale or distribution of literature. 29 Such

decisions give greater latitude to speakers than might have been expected
given the Court's starting assumptions-for example, that regulations

past discrimination - even if that discrimination was not committed intentionally by the state,
or the scope of the redress is not limited to the individual victims of adjudicable
discrimination. For example, a city or state might use race-conscious procurement policies
where it had merely been a "'passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by
elements of the local construction industry," rather than a deliberate practitioner of racial
exclusion itself. City of Richmond v. LA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, L). And, "[i]n the extreme case, some form of narrowly
tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion,"
id. at 509, whether or not such preferences were limited to making particular victims of
adjudicable discrimination whole. Indeed, Justice Scalia concurred separately in both Croson
and Adarand to emphasize his disagreement with the. Court to the extent it authorized raceconscious measures extending beyond remediation for identified victims of discriminationthe only sort of remediation he would regard as consistent with a constitutional norm of color
blindness. Id. at 526 (Scalia, L, concurring in the judgment). See also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, L, concurring in part and in the judgment).
26. For example, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-77 (1992), the Court
invalidated a requirement that a state take title to undisposed radioactive waste while at the
same time upholding conditional funding provisions.
27. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (unanimously
striking down law barring the placement of symbols likely to arouse racial anger or alarm)
with Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-90 (1993) (upholding aggravated penalty for
racially motivated assault).
28. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855, 866-68 (1997) (striking down
provisions of an injunction requiring protestors to stai a certain distance from clinic entrants
but upholding provisions requiring protestors to stay a certain distance from clinic entrances);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (striking down provisions of
an injunction barring signs near a clinic and establishing buffer zones at back and side of
building, but upholding provisions barring noise near a clinic and establishing a buffer zone at
the front perimeter and entrance).
29. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685
(1992); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992)
(per curiam).
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designed to protect access to abortion clinics are content neutral and that
airports are not latter-day public forums.30
In short, the Rehnquist Court has not simply followed but in some cases
has defied and in other cases stopped short of the outcomes that might have
been predicted by the election returns. These results typically depended on
votes of at least one of the five Reagan-Bush nominees, necessarily so in the
seven years since Justice Thomas' appointment, and in some cases received
the support of several. The following sections explore the role of
institutional factors, jurisprudential considerations, and ideological
complexity in helping to explain such votes.

m.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Two features of the Court's institutional situation in relation to the other
branches suggest reasons why conservative Justices might vote moderate or
liberal. The first and most distinctive institutional feature of the Supreme
Court is its relative insulation from political pressures. 31 Politics may play an
inevitable role in the nomination and confirmation process, but constitutional
guarantees of lifetime tenure and protection from salary cuts32 afford the
Justices considerable opportunity to change their minds. Thus, a Justice's
opinions, over time, may cease to bear much resemblance to his or her
political profile at the time of nomination and appointment.
Assuming that Justices sometimes diverge from their predicted political
profile while in office, is there any structural reason to suppose that the shift
will be in a "liberal" rather than a "conservative" direction? To be sure, there
are counterexamples. President Kennedy's only appointee, Justice Byron
White, arguably grew more conservative during his long tenure on the
bench,33 except for his nearly parliamentary willingness to defer to the
30. Whether the pro-speaker position in such cases is properly denominated "liberal" is
a controversial question. In cases involving racist speech and abortion clinic protests it might
be argued that the free speech libertarian position has migrated from the left to the right of the
political spectrum. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383-85, 393-94 (1995)
(characterizing the shifting political valences of recent free speech controversies as an instance
of 'ideological drift"').
31. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmics 16-23 (1962) (famously noting the counter-majoritarian
difficulty that flows from the very insulation of the Supreme Court from political pressure,
coupled with the power of judicial review).
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
33. For example, Justice White concurred in the judgment in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965), invalidating a prohibition of contraceptive use on substantive
due process grounds, but found no similar Constitutional warrant for protecting access to
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(usually Democratic) Congress.3 4 But, it is at least plausible to suppose that
insulation from political majorities typically creates a structural incentive to
articulate and protect the interests of political minorities, if only through
repeat exposure to such claims and a desire to distinguish the work of the
judiciary from that of the political branches. This tendency will often,
though not always, appear politically "liberal. 35
A second and independent institutional explanation arises from the
Justices' concern to protect the Supreme Court's credibility. The Supreme
Court cannot tax, nor does it possess armed forces to back up its
decisions.37 Lacking power of sword or purse, the Court depends on the
power of its legitimacy.3 8 At first glance, the legitimacy problem seems
more likely to generate conservative decisions than liberal ones. After all,
the Court's legitimacy would appear most threatened when the Court protects
the interests of a small minority over the intense opposition of the majority. 9
However, the Court's need to preserve its legitimacy might motivate
unexpectedly liberal decisions in some situations because its reputation
depends on the perception that its legal pronouncements transcend ordinary
politics. Conservative Justices might favor results that appear liberal in the
short run in order to diffuse any suspicion that they are caving in to political
pressure from their conservative sponsors and their allies. One way of doing
this is to abide by stare decisis and entrench earlier liberal decisions even if
they would not be reached again as an initial matter.
The pivotal joint opinion of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,40 for example,
abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting), or consensual
adult sexual conduct, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (per curiam) (White

J.).
34. For example, Justice White voted to invalidate minority business preferences in
procurement by state and local governments, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 511 (1989), but voted to uphold a preference for minority-owned broadcast licensees
that was promulgated by the FCC at the direction of Congress, see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,

497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990).
35. If a challenged policy is itself 'liberal," then counter-majoritarian decisionmaking

will appear "conservative." The Court's recent affirmative action and race-based districting
cases provide an illustration. The Court invalidated popularly enacted programs in order to
protect individual members of the racial majority. Another example might be the Court's
recent federalism decisions, where it has struck down acts of Congress in the name of divided
government.
36. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
37. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

38. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 129-70
(1980) (discussing the legitimacy problem).

39. See id. at 132-33.
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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declined to overrule Roe v. Wade41 in part on the ground that the Court ought
not overturn settled law in the face of vehement public controversy over
abortion, lest it appear to be doing politics rather than law.42 Likewise, the
Court's recent decisions invalidating most affirmative action programs, but
holding out the possibility that some such programs might be justified by
remedial or distributive concerns expressed in earlier cases, might be read as
seeking to avoid a perception that the Court interprets the Constitution in
light of the latest public opinion polls. Similarly, in the area of federal-state
relations, Justice Kennedy strikingly defied any preconceived label as a rigid
antifederalist by casting the decisive vote in a single Term both to invalidate
43
a federal gun-possession statute as exceeding Commerce Clause authority,
and to invalidate state-imposed term limits on members of Congress as
exceeding state authority. 44
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

A second explanation of why conservative Justices might vote moderate
or liberal is that they have a jurisprudential orientation that moderates or
constrains any ideological tendencies they might have.
Justices'
jurisprudential tendencies tend to follow one of two general approaches to
fashioning legal directives. One aVProach employs bright-line rules, while
the other utilizes flexible standards. Rules, generally speaking, bind a legal
decision-maker in a fairly determinate manner by capturing underlying
principles or policies in ways that then operate independently. What gives a
rule its force is that judges will follow it in fairly rote fashion even where a
particularized application of the background principle might arguably yield a
different result. Standards, on the other hand, allow judges to apply the
background principle more directly to a fact situation.
To take a simple example; suppose you wished to ensure safe driving on
a highway. You might set a rule: "drive no faster than fifty-five miles per

41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-69.
43. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995).
44. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995). Justice
Kennedy argued that the Court ought both to stop the states from "invad[ing] the sphere of
federal sovereignty," and to hold the federal government "within the boundaries of its own
power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the [s]tates." Id. at 841 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
45. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court: 1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992), and MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987), for a discussion on rules and standards.
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hour." Alternatively, you might set a standard of reasonableness: "drive
safely for the highway conditions."
What are the comparative advantages of each approach? Rules
constrain the discretion of the decision-maker who applies them 46 and
typically require the determination of only very limited issues of fact. For
example, under the fifty-five miles per hour rule, a police officer only needs
to determine at what speed the car was traveling. The fifty-five miles per
hour rule also prevents two police officers from treating identical situations
differently, whereas under the "reasonableness" standard, one driver might
be ticketed while the other drives away free. Thus, the advantages of rules
include certainty, predictability, formal fairness, clear notice to those they
govern, and economy in the process of decision-making. 47
Standards, by contrast, require consideration of more facts. Under the
"drive safely for the conditions" standard, for example, a police officer must
take into account the time of day, the weather, the volume of traffic, and so
forth. Standards thus give more discretion to the decision-maker in deciding
particular cases. Though less predictable and more time-consuming to apply
than rules, those who favor standards would say that they are more
substantively fair and accurate than rules in capturing the relevant policy
concern. For example, while the fifty-five miles per hour rule might prohibit
a driver from reaching a safe sixty miles per hour on an empty straightaway
under sunny skies but permit a driver to travel a treacherous fifty miles per
hour on a rain-slicked curve at rush hour, the "drive safely" standard might
correct such anomalous outcomes.4a Advocates of standards also approve
their flexibility and capacity to evolve in their application over time with
changing mores or circumstances.
Constitutional doctrines, like traffic rules, may be expressed in the form
of either rules or standards. 49 Approaches that use categorical, formal,
bright-line tests are rule-like. For example, consider holdings that obscenity
is unprotected speech, 50 or that the legislature may not wield executive

46. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs: A PHiLOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULES-BASED DECISION-MAKING INLAW AND IN LnE 157-62 (1991) ("A decision-maker
not -constrained by rules has the power, the authority, the jurisdiction to take everything into
account. Conversely, the rules-constrained decision-maker loses at least some of that

jurisdiction.").
47. Id. at 96-98 (discussing the virtues of "predictability, reliability, and certainty");
Sullivan, supra note 45, at 62-66 (discussing substantive arguments favoring rules and
standards).
48. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 66-69.
49. See id. at 69-95.
50. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973), for the rule-like holding that
obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment.
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power,51 or vice versa. 52 Almost as rule-like in practice are tests that use
strong presumptions to decide cases once a threshold classification has been
made. When the Court employs strict scrutiny-such as to review
infringements of fundamental rights,53 content based suppression of speech, 54
or suspect classifications 55 -it is nearly impossible for the government to
prove the law constitutional.
Conversely, when the Court employs
rationality review-for example, to review challenges to socioeconomic
legislation 5 -- the Court typically defers to the judgments of the other
branches so that it is difficult, if not nearly impossible, for the challenger to
win. This two-tiered system of scrutiny limits judicial discretion because
once the Court has sorted a challenged law into the appropriate tier, it is
confined to the resulting decisional rule, as are the lower courts in deciding
analogous cases.
By contrast, constitutional tests that employ balancing, intermediate
scrutiny, or functional analysis operate as standards. Consider the Court's
express use of intermediate scrutiny to evaluate laws that classify individuals
based on gender,57 as well as facially neutral laws with a disproportionate
adverse effect on interstate commerce, 58 and facially neutral laws with a

51. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (invalidating a statute that
delegated executive budget-cutting authority to the Comptroller General, who was subject to
removal by joint resolution of Congress).
52. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952)
(holding that the President may not encroach upon the legislative power by ordering takings of
private steel mills without congressional authority).
53. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to
abortion regulations).
54. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a Minnesota
ordinance that prohibited symbols raising anger or alarm on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting the need for exacting scrutiny to protect discrete and insular minorities).
56. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (rejecting claim
that taking private land for immediate resale to private homeowners did not constitute a taking
for public use); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178-79 (1980)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to denial of retirement benefits to workers based on dates
rather than length of service); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955)
(rejecting substantive due process challenge to law barring opticians from fitting eyeglasses
without prescription).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (inquiring whether
the government can offer an "exceedingly persuasive justification").
58. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (inquiring whether
the burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits").
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substantial adverse impact on speech or expressive conduct. 59 Intermediate
scrutiny, like standard-based reasoning generally, asks how strong the
government's interest is in relation to the constitutional policy at stake.
Functional analyses of separation of powers challenges provide another
example of standard-like reasoning. Whereas formal approaches would
condemn any trespass by one branch into another's powers, a functional
approach invalidates only those trespasses that go too far.60 These overtly
balancing modes of analysis gives judges considerably greater discretion than
the stark extremes of strict or rational review.
The Court deviates from rules to standards, if more informally,
whenever it weakens the presumption traditionally embodied in strict
scrutiny or rationality review. For example, applying "strict but not fatal"
review to race-based affirmative action invites governments employing such
measures to try to justify them in court. 61 Conversely, applying aggressive
rationality review to invalidate laws found to reflect irrational animus-for
example, the prohibition on gay rights claims struck down in Romer v.
Evans---invites claimants to challenge measures ranging beyond
traditionally suspect classifications. Either way, the two-tier approach
collapses into de facto balancing.
A preference for constitutional standards over constitutional rules will
tend to register as political moderation because, generally speaking, rules are
more effective than standards at effecting sharp and lasting changes in
constitutional interpretation. Standards allow the Court to decide cases
narrowly:
63 for example, this waiting period is not on its face an undue
burden, this wholesale preclusion of gay antidiscrimination claims is
unjustified, 64 this particular district was drawn with excessive attention to
racial demographics.6 5 The use of standards tends to moderate sharp swings
between ideological poles; standards allow future courts more discretion to
distinguish prior cases and decide cases in fact-specific fashion, and thus to
afford more solace and spin opportunities to the losers.

59. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968) (rejecting a facial
and as-applied challenge to a law criminalizing the burning of a draft card and establishing the

modem Court's test for analyzing content-neutral laws as inquiring whether the law closely
fits a substantial government interest).
60. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-93 (1988) (upholding independent
counsel statute because it did not "unduly trammel on executive authority," or "unduly
interfere with the role of the Executive Branch").
61. See supra note 25.

62.
63.
64.
65.

116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-901 (1992).
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,917 (1995).
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Of the five Justices Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed to the Court,
only two (Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas) turned out to favor
rules; 66 the other three (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) have
tended to favor standards. 67 The latter group's preference for standards in
deciding constitutional cases furnishes one explanation for unexpectedly
moderate or liberal decisions.
To take a few examples, consider first the issue of race-based
affirmative action. Four Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas,
would favor a rule that the Constitution should be color blind, and that no
race-conscious measures should ever be permissible, whether aimed at
subordinating or benefiting racial minorities. On the other hand, four
Justices would apparently defer to many race-conscious measures designed
to benefit minorities while still striking down race-conscious measures that
are designed to disadvantage minorities, believing that they can perceive the
difference between a no trespassing sign and a welcome mat. Between these
two camps stands Justice O'Connor-the key swing vote on this issue-who
would permit some limited race-conscious measures where they are shown to
be closely tied to remedying past discrimination, relatively broadly
defined.68 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Miller v. Johnson69
does something similar in asking whether race is the "predominant" factor in
how electoral district boundaries are drawn, rather than in precluding racial
considerations altogether.70 By saying that race-conscious measures are
sometimes, if rarely, permissible, such standards and race-based
distinguishing plans give governments the latitude to defend some
affirmative action plans and lower courts the wiggle room to uphold them.
To take another example, consider the First Amendment's bar on
establishment of religion. As many as four Justices at any given time, led by
Justice Scalia, have argued for a narrow rule that only sectarian preferences
71
and outright coercion of faith ought to count as forbidden establishment.
66. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 65-95.
67. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1176 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[a]
government of laws means a government of rules" and that the majority's functional analysis
of separation of powers was "ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law").
68. See supra note 25. While agreeing that all racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny, Justice O'Connor's view is that strict scrutiny here is no longer "fatal in fact"
collapses a rule into something like a standard; affirmative action plans are evaluated by how
starkly they consider race (is race merely a factor or is it dispositive?) and how closely tied
they are to remedying discrimination.
69. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
70. Id. at 917.
71. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined
by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Thomas).
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Justice O'Connor, however, has led a slim majority of the Court to maintain
a broader and more flexible standard, holding that the Establishment Clause
also forbids any government actibn that a reasonable observer would
interpret as government "endorsement" of religion.72 This standard is highly
fact-intensive and susceptible to shifting outcomes. For example, a publicly
sponsored Christmas creche might be permissible if surrounded by reindeer
and a talking wishing well in a shopping district,73 but not if standing alone
on a courthouse staircase. 74 This standard permits courts to invalidate more
public religious expression than they would under Justice Scalia's rule.
As a further example, consider the limits of free speech in public spaces
other than the traditional public forum of streets and parks. In a 1992
decision involving Hare Krishna devotees seeking to leaflet and solicit in the
New York airport terminals, 75 four Justices, led by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, would have established a bright-line rule: airports are not
traditional public forums for speech akin to streets and parks, and the First
Amendment therefore permits unlimited regulation of speech there, so long
as it is viewpoint-neutral. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, steered
the Court to a split result: leafleting must be permitted in the airports though
soliciting need not.76 They did so by embracing, in slightly different terms, a
standard that focused on whether the particular speech was reasonably
compatible with the functioning of the public space.77 A compatibility
inquiry gives more flexibility to the courts to enforce free speech rights than
does a rigid hierarchy of types of public places.78
As a final example, compare two approaches the Rehnquist
Court has
79
taken to separation of powers issues. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court took
a highly flexible balancing approach in upholding the independent counsel
statute by a vote of 8-1.o The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that granting authority to prosecute high-level Executive officers to
appointees whom the President does not select and may not remove at will
does not trench too far upon the Executive power, even if prosecution is

72. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. See id. at 671.

74. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,579 (1989).
75. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992);
Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam).
76. See id.

77. 505 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. For an example of similar split results in a free speech challenge, recall Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinions for the majority in the abortion clinic protest cases. See supra

note 28.
79. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

81. Id. at 658.
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inherently executive in nature. 81 A scathing dissent by Justice Scalia
objected to this brand of prudentialism in structural matters, arguing that the
issue should be the nature and not the degree of the infringement.82 By
contrast, last Term, in Printz v. United States,83 the Court invalidated, by a
vote of 5-4, a federal requirement that local law enforcement officers
perform background checks on handgun purchasers to ensure their
conformity to federal standards. The Court reasoned that structural principles
of federalism forbade any conscription of state or local officers in
end.84
administering federal law, however trivial the burden or desirable the
Writing this time for the majority, Justice Scalia flatly stated that any
"'balancing' analysis is inappropriate," and that "no comparative assessment
of the various interests" could overcome the affront to state sovereignty
embodied in such a law.85 Plainly, the Morrison standard afforded the
government more leeway for structural innovation than the Printz rule, and
against the political backdrop at the time, appeared unexpectedly politically
moderate.86
The embrace of standards over rules thus leads conservative Justices to
reach results that, in a period when the Court is moving rightward, appear
more moderate or liberal than would a rule fashioned from a similar
ideological starting point.87 This observation gives rise to an antecedent
question: Why do some Justices favor rules and others favor
standards? Why any particular Justice is drawn to either disposition is
perhaps ultimately a psychological, biographical, or even aesthetic
question. But to the extent the choice is conscious and articulate, it is likely
to follow from different conceptions of the judicial role. Like the
institutional considerations discussed above in Part II, the choice of rules or
standards might be understood as a strategy for maintaining the Court's
legitimacy. Each camp 88might claim that its method facilitates greater judicial
modesty than the other.

81. Id. at 679-85.
82. See id. at 711-12, 733-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
84. See generally id. at 2384.
85. Id. at 2383.
86. Whether endorsement of independent counsels is understood as politically liberal or
conservative at any time period, of course, depends to some extent on the political affiliation
of such counsels' targets.
87. Of course, the choice of standards over rules might have the opposite political
valence in a period when the Court is moving leftward. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, PostLiberal Judging: The Roles of Categorizationand Balancing, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 293, 30708 (1992).
88. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 112-22.
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Specifically, those who favor rules, like positivists and codifiers of

earlier generations, seek to limit the exercise of discretion in judicial
decision-making, and thus favor the reduction of constitutional propositions

as much as possible to claims of fact, not value. They suspect that the
context-specific application of standards will lead judges inappropriately to
impose their own values. Those who favor standards, in contrast, see their
role in constitutional interpretation as akin to that of common law judges,
requiring reference to the accretion of past history, precedent, and collective
wisdom in order to constrain the inevitable exercise of some contemporary
discretionary judgment.89 Justices who favor a common law approach to

constitutional interpretation believe that they will be disciplined from
imposing their own values by our traditions, social practices, shared
understandings, and the process of reasoned elaboration from -such starting
points. They believe that it is more arrogant to assert the philosophical 9 or

interpretive certainty required by announcement of a single inflexible rule.

0

Those who choose standards over rules might believe that such a

choice, in addition to embodying judicial restraint, promotes judicial
legitimacy in several other ways.

It might, as a type of alternative

constitutional dispute resolution, help to defuse sharp ideological conflict by
giving something to each side. Relatedly, it might take steps toward a
desired constitutional end-state while minimizing the expressive injury to the
losers. 91 Finally, it might seem to facilitate democratic debate and resolution
of the matters it leaves unresolved, placing conflict over values more
squarely in the hands of the people than of judges. 92 Whatever its
89. Such organicism is evident, for example, in the Casey joint opinion sustaining while
narrowing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and in Justice Souter's concurring opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2283 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (analogizing his approach to interpreting the Due Process Clause to the judicial
method of the common law).
90. For an example of such a critique, see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the

Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When bedrock principles collide,
they test the limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of a Grand
Unified Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified.").
91. For example, the Casey decision overruled several post-Roe decisions, see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (upholding waiting period requirements
that prior decisions had struck down), even while leaving Roe's Constitutional bar to criminal
prohibition intact, with the net effect that abortion must be permitted but could be discouraged.
Thus an opinion that reaffirmed the right to abortion at the same time constricted the scope of
that right as a practical matter.
92. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving

Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1996). Sunstein argues that "shallow and
narrow" constitutional rulings are more desirable than "deep and broad" rulings on the ground
that they remand matters for democratic deliberation. To the extent that standards are the
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jurisprudential or institutional motivation, the choice of standards over rules
will register on the political spectrum as unexpectedly moderate or liberal
during a period of general rightward shift.
V. THE COMPLEXITY OF CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

A third reason why conservative Justices might appear to vote moderate
or liberal is that the very concept of constitutional conservatism is quite
complex. A judicial conservative might be thought to favor, at least to some
degree, any of the following: 1) originalism; 2) textualism; 3) judicial
restraint (deference to legislatures); 4) libertarianism (deregulation);
5) states' rights (decentralization); 6) traditionalism; 7) stare decisis;
8) capitalism; and 9) law and order. These different strands of judicial
conservatism may sometimes pull in competing directions, both among
Justices, and even within a single Justice across an array of cases. And when
one strand trumps others, the outcome of the case may appear surprisingly
moderate or liberal.
Such tensions are easy to identify in divided decisions by the Rehnquist
Court. For example, adherence to the original meaning of the Constitution
may trump deference to the government for sake of law and order. Justices
Scalia and Thomas, typically the Court's staunchest advocates of originalism,
have sometimes voted with criminal defendants and against the government
where they thought that the framers must have meant to forbid modem
practices, such as videotaped testimony in child sexual abuse cases 9 3 or
unannounced drug raids.94
Original meaning may be at odds with traditionalism. For example,
Justice Thomas voted to sustain a First Amendment right to distribute
anonymous election leaflets, reasoning that the framers themselves had
engaged in anonymous debates over the Constitution, signing their writings5
with a variety of pseudonyms from "Publius" to the "Federal Fanner."
Justice Scalia, dissenting, found the originalist record ambiguous and would
have deferred instead to the long tradition and current legislative practice96 in
nearly all states of requiring identifying information in election literature.

device for achieving shallow and narrow rulings; however, it is hardly obvious that
ambiguities left open by the decision will be remanded for democratic resolution, as opposed
to further litigation.
93. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
95. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 359-69 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
96. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/7

16

Sullivan: The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court

1998]

Sullivan

Stare decisis may be at odds with any of the other strands of
conservatism. The decisive joint opinion in Casey, for example, embraced a
strong if limited respect for stare decisis, reaffirming Roe's central holding
without regard to whether it was correct as an original matter. 97 The
dissenters, in contrast, saw stare decisis as far too weak to overcome the lack
of clear textual or originalist authority for invalidating popularly enacted
abortion regulation. Similarly, in Establishment Clause challenges to such
practices as official school prayer, invocations of original practices such as
George Washington praying at his inauguration have 98failed to overcome
precedents limiting government endorsement of religion.
Some opinions would seem to represent a triumph of libertarianism over
textual or originalist literalism or judicial restraint. For example, all the
Justices except Chief Justice Rehnquist recently proved willing to invalidate,
as an unreasonable search and seizure, state-mandated drug testing for
political candidates. 99 In others, strict adherence to text and original meaning
may yield to some combination of stare decisis, traditionalism, and a robust
view of property rights. For example, Justice Scalia, who typically favors
textualist and originalist readings, exemplified this when he wrote an opinion
for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,10 calling for strict
review under the Takings Clause of regulations that sharply diminish
property values-even though the Takings Clause says nothing about
regulation of property whose title is not transferred to the state, and even
though the framers did not envision applying the Takings Clause to such
regulations. 1
These examples could be multiplied indefinitely, but suffice to illustrate
that any effort to carry out a program of judicial "conservatism" in
constitutional interpretation involves a simultaneous equation with multiple
variables. Even a single Justice pegged as a conservative may be pulled in
different directions. The outcome of a case, therefore, depends not only upon
a Justice's default weighing of these variables, but on the relative strength of
97. Stare decisis, or respect for precedent, carries varying degrees of weight among the
five Justices appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter give considerable respect to at least the core of prior precedents. Justices Scalia and
Thomas are more willing to overturn "unsound" precedents. See, e.g., John Wallace, Stare
Decisis and the Relmquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism and Politics in Casey,

42 BuFF.L. REv. 187, 205-07 (1994).
98. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (compare Souter's concurrence at 60910 with Scalia's dissent at 632-36, noting early historical examples of official prayer).
99. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997).
100. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
101. His reference points instead were precedent, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922), and traditional cultural "understandings" of the contours of property, see
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
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each particular ideological pull in the differing circumstances of each case.
To complicate matters still further, Justices may agree on a variable but
disagree strenuously over its application. For example, consider the dueling
originalism that has led the majority and dissent to disagree vigorously as to
whether the framers did or did not intend that Congress might employ state
officials to administer federal programs, 02 or whether the framers did or did
not intend that the Establishment
Clause bar only that aid to religion which
10 3
others.
over
sect
one
preferred
Finally, constitutional rights sometimes may undergo what might be
called "ideological drift. ' °4 That is, rights once thought of as having liberal
provenance are embraced by conservatives even as liberal attachment to
them falters. There is no better recent example than freedom of
speech.10 5 Free speech rights were traditionally asserted in this century by
anarchists, socialists, syndicalists, and communists, and closer to our own
time by the pioneers of racial civil rights and opponents of the war in
Vietnam. But left-wing support is not always forthcoming when free speech
claims are asserted by racist cross-burners, anti-abortion demonstrators, large
corporate advertisers, or donors of large sums to political campaigns. In the
latter sort of case, liberals often favor government regulation designed to
ensure racial dignity, reproductive privacy, or greater equality in the
marketplace of ideas, and conservative groups take up the banner of free
speech libertarian opposition.
In such circumstances, popular views of the political valence of
decisions may lag behind the ideological drift, leading to the perception that
conservative Justices have voted "liberal" on free speech, and vice
versa. For example, in a recent abortion clinic protest case, the traditionally
liberal Justice Stevens voted to uphold all restrictions on the protestors while
the historically conservative Justice Scalia would have struck them all

102. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (compare the majority opinion
at 2370-75 with Stevens' dissent at 2389-94).
103. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (compare Thomas' concurring opinion at 855-58 with Souter's dissent at 866-76).
104. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 393-94.
105. For another example, consider the shift from left to right on the political spectrum
of the view that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection is a guarantee of
formal equality that bars all official use of race as a classification. Today, many conservatives
use a principle once urged in the civil rights movement to reject affirmative action and
aggressive interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, while many liberals eschew formal
equality claims in favor of a view of the Equal Protection Clause as an antisubordination
principle under which benign racial classifications should not be treated the same as invidious
ones.
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down.1°6 Similarly, in a recent campaign finance case, the supposedly
conservative Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia embraced vigorously the
free speech rights of political parties while several supposedly liberal Justices
expressed willingness to allow wide-ranging government regulation of
campaign finance. 1°7 Because the press has an institutional interest in strong
First Amendment protection, such decisions are apt to be reported as
"liberal" victories for free speech, even if the credit must go to
"conservative" Justices.
VI. CONCLUSION

This essay has suggested three possible explanations-institutional,
jurisprudential and ideological--of why a Court moving generally rightward
might nonetheless be characterized occasionally by surprising judicial
moderation or even a liberal turn. These factors help show why it is so
difficult to capture the work of the Court along a single political
vector: "sharp right turn," or "the center holds." There is nothing mutually
inconsistent among these accounts. Indeed, they may reinforce one another,
as when institutional concerns influence jurisprudential orientation. And
these accounts help to refute the view, sometimes expressed in popular
commentary, that the moderate judicial behavior of the swing Justices on the
Rehnquist Court is incoherent or inexplicable.

106. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,777 (1994). The majority in
Madsen, steering between the poles set by Justices Stevens and Scalia, upheld some of the

restrictions but not others.
107. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n v. F.E.C., 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
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